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I pose problems for the views that human nature should be the object of study in 
the social and behavioral sciences and that a concept of human nature is needed 
to guide research in these sciences.  I proceed by outlining three research 
programs in the social sciences, each of which confront aspects of human 
variation.  Next I present Elizabeth Cashdan and Grant Ramsey's related 
characterizations of human nature.  I go on to argue that the research 
methodologies they each draw on are more productive resources for social 
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Confronting Variation in the Social and Behavioral Sciences 
 
1. Introduction.  Philosophers and social scientists defend various accounts of 
human nature that are labeled non-essentialist.  Such accounts are claimed both 
to characterize the object of inquiry for the social and behavioral sciences and to 
constrain and guide research (Cashdan, 2013; Griffiths, 2011; Machery, 2008; 
Ramsey, 2013; Samuels, 2012).  The conceptual debate over whether there are 
defensible non-essentialist accounts of human nature is ongoing (See e.g. Dupre, 
1998; Kronfeldner, Roughley, & Toepfer, 2014; Lewens, 2012, 2015; Machery, 
2008, 2012, Forthcoming; Samuels, 2012).  Here I present some problems for the 
view that human nature should be the object of study in the social and 
behavioral sciences as well as the idea that a concept of human nature is needed 
to guide or constrain the social and behavioral sciences.  I conclude that pursuing 
a concept of human nature is not a productive approach to confronting human 
variation.  Further, I conclude that some proposed characterizations of human 
nature are better understood as competing evolutionary approaches to 
confronting human variation.  I begin by outlining three research programs in 
the social sciences, each of which confront aspects of human variation via what I 
call a variationist approach.  This approach does not rely on an account of human 
nature. 
 
2. Variationists in the social sciences. Variationists in the social and behavioral 
sciences accept that variation is pervasive and confront it head on1.  They 
document variation and seek to explain its sources.  Variationists come from 
many fields.  Variationist work is more like work in population genetics or 
evolutionary ecology2 than it is like much work in anthropology or cognitive 
psychology.  In contrast to the variationist approach, much work in cognitive 
psychology is carried out under the assumption that there are shared, basic 
psychological capacities that underlie our behavior and characterizing these 
basic capacities serves an explanatory function.  Also, much work in 
anthropology is carried out under the assumption that there are human 
universals and the main aim of anthropology is to delineate these universals.  
Here I outline the work of three variationists in the social sciences. 
 
   2.1 Stanovich on reasoning.  Much work in the psychology of reasoning is taken 
to support the conclusion that we are irrational or at least deficient in our 
reasoning capacities (See e.g. Cohen, 1981; Stich, 1990).  Well-known 
experiments, often used illustratively in philosophy classes, are taken to reveal 
that we cannot reason deductively very well or that we are susceptible to 
fallacies such as ignoring base rates.  There are a number of hypotheses about 
                                                
1 James Tabery (2014) labels some social science researchers “variation-
partitioners” in contrast with “mechanism-elucidators.”  Variation-partitioners 
consider the issue of how much variation can be attributed to various candidate 
causes of variation.  The group identified here as “variationist” includes both 
Tabery’s variation-partitioners and mechanism-elucidators along with others in 
the social sciences who confront and seek to understand human variation. 
2 In this regard, the variationist approach is closely aligned with populationist 
thinking, which Sober distinguishes from typological thinking (Sober, 1980). 
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what mechanisms underlie our reasoning that would produce such results in 
experimental situations.  One view is that we have an innate deductive reasoning 
mechanism but, like our innate language capacity, the mechanism gives us a 
competence but our performance falls down in empirical situations (See e.g. 
Macnamara, 1986).  Stanovich (1999) takes a different approach to the results of 
the experimentation on reasoning than most of his colleagues in cognitive 
psychology.  He “attempts to foreground a type of empirical data that has been 
underutilized […] in the debate about human rationality” data about individual 
differences (1999, 2).  He says that parties to the rationality discussion in 
psychology overemphasize modal responses and ignore patterns of difference in 
responses, including the occurrence of the correct response in all experiments.  
Stanovich (1999) presents the study of human reasoning as the study of variation 
and individual differences in reasoning. 
Various forms of the Wason Selection (Wason, 1966; Wason & Johnson-
Laird, 1972) task are used in experiments on deductive reasoning (See figure 1. 
below).  In more abstract versions of the task, such as the card removal task, 
experimenters find very low percentages of subjects provide the “correct” 
answer.  The “correct” answer in the deductive reasoning literature is the answer 
that would be obtained by using only valid deductive inference.  Stanovich 
(1999) averages over findings from a number of abstract Wason style selection 
tasks and finds that around 10% of subjects provide the correct answer.  On 
selection tasks with more contextual cues, subjects perform much better but a 
significant percentage of subjects still do not provide the “correct” answer.  
Stanovich performs various comparative studies in an attempt to find patterns in 
the variation.  For example, he compares subjects’ performance on SAT tests with 
their performance on various reasoning tests. 
 
                                                      Figure 1. 
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   2.2 Henrich and WEIRD people.  Many in the cognitive sciences proceed on the 
assumption that there are basic psychological capacities, whose existence is 
demonstrated by experimental work.  Joe Henrich and his colleagues (2010) 
argue that there is far less support for basic psychological capacities if 
experiments are performed on subjects from countries other than western, 
educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD) countries.  The bulk of 
psychological experimentation is performed on subjects from WEIRD countries 
and Henrich et al. question why these subjects should be presented as 
“representative of the species” as opposed subjects from any other population3.  
In a recent study Henrich and his collaborators (2010) collect results from 
experiments performed on subjects from non-WEIRD countries and compare 
them to the results from the same experiments on subjects from WEIRD 
countries.  What they reveal is a great deal of variation in subject responses.  
They conclude “members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are 
among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about 
humans” (2010, 61). They also warn “we need to be less cavalier in addressing 
questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, 
and rather unusual, slice of humanity” (2010, 61). 
Henrich et al. present one study that indicates cross cultural variation in 
our responsiveness to the Müller-Lyre illusion (2010, 64-65).  The Müller-Lyre 
illusion is taken to be extremely robust and thought to reveal underlying 
constancies in our visual processing.  These assumptions contribute to the 
illusions’ important role in Fodor’s (1983) argument for the modularity of the 
visual system.  Henrich et al. present the results from Segal et al.’s (1966) cross 
cultural study on visual perception.  Segal et al. tested responses to the Müller-
Lyre illusion along with several other well-known perceptual illusions, such as 
the Sander Parallelogram, on subjects from a wide range of cultures (Henrich, 
2008).  They found that the strongest effect of the Müller-Lyre illusion is on what 
Henrich et al. now call WEIRD people (See also Henrich, 2008).4  Henrich et al. 
present the results of many other studies that show differences between WEIRD 
and non-WEIRD subjects’ responses to psychological tests.  For example, there is 
evidence of variation in spatial cognition across cultures (2010, 68) and variation 
in the way in which people from different cultures play Ultimatum Games (2010, 
65). 
 
   2.3  Cashdan and variation in women’s waist-hip ratios.  A well known 
evolutionary psychology hypothesis about human mate selection is that men are 
                                                
3 Rebecca Dresser (1992) poses and discusses the related question: How did white 
males become the prototype research subject in the medical sciences? 
4 There were a few follow-up studies (Davis & Carlson, 1970; Jahoda, 1966) 
conducted at around the same time as the Segal et al. study that produced partial 
replication of the Segal et al. results and challenged Segal et al.’s explanatory 
hypotheses for the relevant variation.  These studies used subjects from one non-
WEIRD population and subjects from a WEIRD population but did not repeat 
the Segal et al. study in the same range of populations (These studies were 
brought to my attention by Joe Henrich and Edouard Machery, personal 
communication). 
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attracted to women with a waist-hip ratio (WHR) close to .7 (Singh, 1993; Singh 
& Luis, 1995).  Singh et al. proposed that .7 is the optimal WHR as it is the  
WHR most prevalent in young women of child-bearing age.  Their claim is not 
just that men are most attracted to women with optimal WHR’s but that they 
have an evolved module for detecting such optimal WHR’s and this module is 
part of the human male mate-selection suite of evolved modules.  Evolutionary 
anthropologist Elizabeth Cashdan (2008) focuses on different aspects of WHR’s.  
She documents a huge amount of variation in WHR.  This variation occurs across 
different dimensions, there is variation among young women, variation among 
older women as well as variation between different populations.   There is also 
variation in women’s lifetimes; in most cases young to old implies low to high 
WHR.  Second, Cashdan (2008) finds an important variable, or set of variables, 
that might contribute to explaining some of this variation in WHR’s: the ratios 
between women’s hormone levels, for example, the ratio of androgen levels to 
other hormone levels.  Finally, Cashdan documents variation in what WHR’s 
men find attractive (Also shown in Yu & Shepard, 1998).  Cashdan (2008) 
discusses the very interesting result of preferred WHR’s increasing during hard 
times or times of low resource in both Western and more traditional societies.  
This indicates that men are tracking something other than just low WHR and 
implies that they do not have an inflexible module for picking out low WHR.  In 
other words, there is variation in what men from different cultures find attractive 
with respect to WHR and there is variation within subjects in what they find 
attractive with respect to WHR depending on available resources.  Cashdan 
concludes that likely the least interesting claim in the WHR literature is that men 
are universally attracted to women with lower WHR’s. 
What all these variationists have in common is that they attempt to 
discover patterns in the variation of human traits and propose hypotheses about 
what could explain these patterns of variation.  In this way their work is closer to 
work in population genetics than to human nature based research in the social 
and behavioral sciences. 
 
3. Variation sensitive accounts of human nature.  I now turn to two accounts of 
human nature that are developed to confront human variation.  They are: 
Elizabeth Cashdan’s norm of reaction account and Grant Ramsey’s life-history 
trait cluster account.  First, I will briefly outline Edouard Machery (2008, 2012, 
Forthcoming) and Richard Samuel’s (2012) accounts of human nature as it is 
useful to contrast them with accounts that emphasize variation. 
 
   3.1.  Machery and Samuels’ non-essentialist accounts of human nature.  Machery 
(2008) distinguishes two independent notions of human nature: the essentialist 
notion, which he rejects along with Hull and others, and the nomological notion, 
his new proposal.  The nomological notion says that “human nature is the set of 
properties that humans tend to possess as a result of the evolution of their 
species” (Machery, 2008, 323).  On this account bipedalism is part of human 
nature but supporting Liverpool Football Club is not.  Machery refers to this part 
of his account as the evolutionary proposal but adds that the nomological notion 
has nothing to do with defining species membership.  His nomological account 
of human nature is not essentialist and is not intended as a proposal for 
delineating our species.  He also maintains that being common among humans is 
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a necessary condition for being part of human nature.  He refers to this as the 
universality proposal of the nomological account.  His idea is that traits that arise 
purely as a result of local cultural circumstances are very unlikely to be common 
among humans.  So his account contains two central proposals the evolutionary 
proposal and the universality proposal. 
Samuels offers a related view to Machery’s, which he dubs the “causal 
essentialist” account of human nature.  He says that “human nature is a suite of 
mechanisms that underlie the manifestation of species-typical cognitive and 
behavioural regularities” (2012, 2).  For Samuels human nature picks out a “set of 
phenomena that will form a focus of empirical enquiry for some region of 
science” (2012, 4).  Samuels claims that his characterization of human nature is “a 
conception on which human nature can play its customary causal-explanatory 
function” (2012, 18) and hence should be adopted over Machery’s nomological 
account. 
 
  3.2.  Cashdan’s norm of reaction account of human nature.  Cashdan, like many 
evolutionary thinkers, emphasizes variation (See her 2008 discussed above).  
Cashdan’s approach to anthropology is grounded in behavioral ecology.  
Behavioral ecologists strive to understand and explain behavior without 
resorting to appeals to underlying psychological mechanisms or underlying 
genetic systems.  Behavioral ecologists focus on relations between organisms’ 
behaviors and aspects of their environments.  Anthropologists relying on this 
approach have presented and defended interesting hypotheses about human 
parenting, food acquisition and distribution and variation in age specific traits.  
In contrast, competing hypotheses from evolutionary psychology about the same 
phenomena are be couched in terms of shared, evolved, internal psychological 
mechanisms that are causally responsible for the relevant behavior.  This 
approach is rejected by behavioral ecologists who emphasize variation over 
commonality.  
Cashdan rejects the assumption, held by many in her field of 
anthropology, that “human nature is found solely in its universals – in the traits 
found in every society” (2013, 71).  Those who hold this assumption (e.g. Brown, 
1991) go onto say that traits found in some cultures but not others are “culturally 
constructed and without an evolutionary foundation” (2013, 71)5.  In contrast 
Cashdan grounds her approach on the assumption that we evolved to be flexible.   
She goes on to propose that we ask how natural selection shaped that flexibility.  
She says that “we cannot understand our universal human nature without 
understanding the variability in its expression” (2013, 71).  Cashdan does aim to 
reveal our nature but argues that our nature is neither a set of underlying causal 
mechanisms (cf. Samuels, 2012) nor the collection of traits that we have as a 
result of evolution (cf. Machery, 2008).  Rather, our nature is to be found in 
patterns of variation.  Cashdan proposes to reveal these patterns in variation by 
invoking norms of reaction, which are “the pattern of expression of a genotype 
across a range of environments” (2013, 71).  Norms of reaction are standardly 
presented by plotting the relation between a trait value and an environmental 
factor for specific genotypes (See Figure 2. below).  According to Cashdan, all the 
                                                
5 This distinction is clearly maintained in Machery’s (2008) account of human 
nature (See also Machery, Forthcoming). 
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reaction norms for all our genes in all environments together constitute our 
nature. 
 
                                                                Figure 2. 
   3.3.  Ramsey’s life history trait cluster account of human nature.  Ramsey (2013) sets 
up his account of human nature by responding to Machery’s nomological 
account of human nature.  He asks “why should we presume that it is the 
sameness across individuals that is of interest to scientists, and not their 
variation?” (2013, 986).  He goes on to conclude his first argument against 
Machery by saying: “it is a mistake to hold that only traits universal (or nearly 
universal) in the human species are of scientific interest and should be included 
within human nature” (2013, 986)  Here he echoes Cashdan’s criticism of her 
colleagues’ over-emphasis on universals in anthropology.  For Ramsey, like 
Cashdan, our focus in the social sciences should be accounting for variation.  He 
proposes to do this guided by a non-essentialist account of human nature that he 
believes improves upon Machery’s nomological account. 
For Ramsey “individual nature is defined as the pattern of trait clusters 
within the individual’s set of possible life histories” and “human nature is 
defined as the pattern of trait clusters within the totality of extant human 
possible life histories” (2013, 987).  He calls this the life-history trait cluster (LTC) 
account of human nature.  Different possible life histories for organisms result 
from the range of possible developmental responses organisms make to differing 
environmental circumstances.  He also proposes that “characterizations of 
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features of human nature are merely descriptions of patterns within the 
collective set of human life histories” (2013, 988).  According to Ramsey, the LTC 
framework shows that “there are patterns within and across human 
heterogeneity” (2013, 992). 
There are others who defend accounts of human nature that encompass 
varaiation.  For example, Clark Barrett (2015) defends a related notion of human 
nature to Cashdan and Ramsey’s, proposing that human nature is the sum total 
of variation in our lineage.  Also, Paul Griffiths (2011) defends a notion of human 
nature derived from Developmental Systems Theory and aimed at accounting for 
the whole range of human diversity.  The details of Cashdan and Ramsey’s 
accounts given here will suffice to support the arguments in the next section that 
apply to all defenders of biological accounts of human nature.  
 
4. Accounts of human nature and confronting variation.  Characterizations of 
human nature are proposed to set both the object of inquiry in the social sciences 
and to guide that inquiry.  Alternately, characterizations of human nature can be 
seen as serving various functions, the most relevant here being a descriptive or 
an explanatory function6.  Cashdan, Ramsey’s and related characterizations of 
human nature all have the same problem: each account amounts to the assertion 
that an enormous collection of traits constitute human nature.  This type of 
account is anticipated by various critics of human nature who argue that such 
accounts are not theoretically interesting (See e.g. Buller, 2005; Futuyma, 1998; 
Hull, 1986).  I apply these criticisms to Cashdan and Ramsey below and also 
argue that these criticisms can be recast to make the point that the relevant 
accounts of human nature fail to perform an explanatory function. 
Cashdan and Ramsey propose that all of the traits that can arise as a result 
of our life long interaction with our environments constitute human nature.  
Their approaches are structurally very close to David Hull’s disjunctive notion of 
universality, which he invokes as an account of human nature that might be 
proposed to confront variation.  Hull uses the example of blood type: ”blood 
type can be made universal among human beings only by defining it in terms of 
having some blood type of other – a disjunctive character” (Hull, 1986, 5).  Hull 
calls this move “universality on the cheap.”  The idea here is that simply 
expanding the list of traits in our nature disjunctively does not result in an 
explanatorily useful notion of human nature.  While it is certainly true that we 
can discover a wide variety of human traits, and that a norm of reaction 
approach or Life History Theory help us understand just how wide that variety 
of traits may be, drawing a line around all of these possible traits does not result 
in a theoretically useful characterization of human nature.  An explanatorily 
useful notion of human nature should be expected to shed light on the variation 
in human reasoning, waist hip ratios, or human cognitive function outlined 
above in Section 2.  What Cashdan and Ramsey’s accounts can offer is the 
observation that all this variation is part of human nature and this alone, does 
not provide any explanatory purchase on all of this variation. 
Most of Cashdan and Ramsey’s critical points against rival human nature 
accounts such as Machery’s and Samuels’ are on target.  For example, claims that 
                                                
6 See Samuels (2012) and Machery (Forthcoming) for more on the various 
functions characterizations of human nature should serve.  
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we should not conceptualize human nature in terms of universality, we should 
emphasize variation over similarity and we should not limit our accounts by 
including only internal properties of organisms all have merit.  Their criticisms of 
alternate accounts of human nature are undermined by their presentation of their 
own approaches as alternate characterizations of human nature.  As we have 
seen, their accounts have drawbacks.  Further, their accounts of human nature do 
not provide guides for research in social and behavioral sciences.  Rather, their 
positive accounts are all best understood as alternate, important and productive 
approaches to studying human variation derived from different areas of 
evolutionary thought.  They present and defend alternate clusters of 
evolutionary methods and explanatory assumptions that can be productively 
applied by social and behavioral scientists confronting human variation. Life 
History Theory or a Norm of Reaction approach could shed important light on 
variation in human reasoning capacities, waist-hip ratios or depth perception.  In 
contrast, accounts of human nature in terms of variation are not likely to increase 
our understanding of these phenomena.  The valuable explanatory potential in 
Cashdan and Ramsey’s accounts comes not from their accounts of human nature 
but from the alternate evolutionary resources they draw upon in constructing 
their accounts. 
There is a very tight relationship between each characterization of human 
nature outlined above and distinct clusters of methods and explanatory 
assumptions.  As we have seen, Cashdan and Ramsey both characterize human 
nature in terms of different approaches in evolutionary biology.  Machery and 
Samuels also explicitly align their characterizations of human nature with 
alternate explanatory approaches in the social sciences.  Machery’s nomological 
notion is designed to be consistent with the research methodology of 
evolutionary psychology, and to some extent sociobiology (2008, 328), and 
Samuel’s notion is designed to be consistent with the research methodology of 
cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience (2012, 27).  Perhaps Samuels 
does not have variation in his sights because cognitive psychologists’ primary 
focus is not on variation.  Stanovich and Henrich’s work, discussed above, can be 
viewed as an attempt to change the focus of their cognitive science colleagues 
towards variation but, this work not withstanding, Samuels is right that the main 
focus in the cognitive sciences is on revealing shared underlying cognitive 
mechanisms.  In contrast, Machery, like Cashdan and Ramsey, draws on an 
avowed evolutionary approach and one central aim of evolutionary biology is 
the delineation of variation and the explanation its causes (cf. Hull, 1986, 5).  The 
puzzle here then is why adopting an evolutionary approach points Machery 
towards commonality rather than variation. 
Machery draws on an approach to evolutionary psychology articulated 
and defended by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (See e.g. Tooby & Cosmides, 
1990, 2005) among others.  Cosmides and Tooby draw an illuminating contrast 
between evolutionary psychology and behavioral genetics (2005, 39).  They argue 
that while behavioral geneticists focus on traits that vary, evolutionary 
psychologists focus on traits that are now universal and do not vary.  These traits 
are the product of evolutionary processes that occurred during the Pleistocene 
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era. 7  Machery does not have to adopt this approach to the letter to still claim that 
evolutionary biologists confront and account for both traits that vary and traits 
that vary very little (cf. Lewens, 2015).  This is true, evolutionary dynamics 
account for both the fixing of traits and the sustenance of variation.  The problem 
here is that contrary to Cosmides and Tooby’s assumption, human traits that 
vary sufficiently minimally and are widely enough distributed to be included in 
Machery’s nomological human nature cluster are unlikely to lead to interesting 
and useful explanations of human traits of interest to social scientists.  It is hard 
to establish that cognitive mechanisms are universal adaptations (cf. Buller, 2005; 
Henrich et al., 2010) but we can point to highly invariant human traits such as 
bipedalism and the size of calcium ion channels are both highly invariant human 
traits but neither provide an obvious basis for productive explanations in the 
social and behavioral sciences.   
All the characterizations of human nature discussed above closely track 
different methodological approaches.  Cashdan, Machery and Ramsey all 
propose a characterization of human nature that draws heavily upon their 
favored evolutionary approach.  What these approaches all have in common is to 
offer alternate evolutionary approaches to social scientists but only the 
approaches offered by Cashdan and Ramsey will help in the quest to account for 
and explain human variation. 
 
5. Conclusion.  Adopting a variationist approach is the more productive strategy 
in the social and behavioral sciences than the search for human universals or 
traits in common that constitute our nature.  Cashdan and Ramsey agree with 
this outlook as they all agree that the explanatory target of each of their 
approaches should be human variation.  Cashdan and Ramsey propose fruitful 
ways of explaining human behavior but I argued that their most fruitful 
contributions are not their alternate characterizations of human nature.  Rather, 
they each provide alternate, evolutionarily influenced, frameworks for 
understanding and explaining human variation, both of which are valuable 
resources for social scientists confronting human variation.  In contrast, Machery 
backs an evolutionary approach that does not contribute to understanding and 
explaining human variation. 
There appear to be almost as many notions of human nature as there are 
clusters of methods and explanatory assumptions in the social and behavioral 
sciences and I take this to undermine the idea that there should be one notion of 
human nature rather than support it.  Productive social and behavioral science is 
a broad based interdisciplinary project.  Participants in this project would have 
plenty of important and productive work left to do if they abandoned the quest 
for an account of human nature and focused on human variation and the attempt 
to account for why it arises and is sustained throughout human populations. 
 
 
                                                
7 Barrett (2015) promotes an approach to evolutionary psychology that does focus 
on variation and criticizes his colleagues for uncritically assuming that universal 
traits should be the focus of evolutionary psychology.   
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